Overlapping labour markets arise when some types of workers do not meet employers with some types of jobs. For example, skilled workers could seek high-skill or low-skill jobs, but low skill workers could be limited to low-skill jobs. The paper derives conditions for equilibrium and efficiency, distinguishes reducible from irreducible overlapping labour markets, and describes distributional impacts of proportional demand shifts and technological change. Many labour models incorporate the structure of overlapping labour markets, so that the results have widespread applicability.
Introduction
A labour market can be regarded as a collection of workers and employers that interact to allocate workers to jobs on the basis of wages and qualifications. Overlapping Labour Markets depart from this simple description. An Overlapping Labour Market (hereafter OLM) arises in a labour market with heterogeneous workers and jobs when direct interactions between particular types of workers and jobs do not occur. The paper describes conditions when OLM's are inefficient and the resulting misallocation of workers and jobs. It also shows how OLM's differ from labour markets where all agents interact. In particular, demand shifts, consisting of proportional changes in numbers of jobs, have distributional impacts. Skill biased technological change has consequences in an OLM that differ from responses with ordinary markets.
In the OLM considered here, unemployed workers and employers with vacancies meet to determine whether the worker should be employed. There are two types of workers, s 1 and s 2 , and two types of jobs, k 1 and k 2 . Type s 1 workers seek either k 1 or k 2 jobs, and employers with k 2 jobs seek either s 1 or s 2 workers. The distinguishing feature of OLM's is that s 2 workers do not seek k 1 jobs, presumably because production would be too low or the workers lack qualifications.
For example, s 1 workers could be college graduates while s 2 workers are high school graduates, and k 1 jobs could require high skills while k 2 jobs only require low skills. Then s 1 workers could get either k 1 or k 2 jobs, but s 2 workers would be limited to k 2 jobs. More specifically, high school graduates and college graduates take jobs as salespeople, but only college graduates take jobs as managers. High school and college graduates work as clerks, and college graduates work as teachers. Native-born and immigrants could take manual labour jobs in a country, while management jobs could go only to native-born workers. In the context of Spanish labour markets, Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2002) analyze a market where workers with high education and low education take unskilled jobs, while skilled jobs go to the workers with high education. Workers with land in India use their own labour and hire landless workers, while landless workers only work for landed workers (Mandal, 2001 ). Labour market structures related to OLM's have been studied previously. Sattinger (1985) describes a labour market where workers set reservation wages and firms set reservation skill levels, generating OLM's. With internal and external labour markets, both currently employed and external workers can take port of entry jobs, while only current workers can take other jobs (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) . In dual labour markets, primary workers can seek jobs in both the primary and secondary labour markets, while rationing limits secondary workers from entering the primary labour market (Saint-Paul, 1996) . In the analysis of overeducation, it is implicitly assumed that some workers with more education take jobs requiring less education (Sicherman, 1991; Hartog, 1992 , Chapter 7). Gautier (2002) analyzes the impact on low-skilled workers when high-skilled workers temporarily accept simple jobs. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) analyze wage inequality in a model where low-skill workers cannot take high-skill jobs. Acemoglu (1999) considers a model in which the skill composition of workers generates differentiation in jobs, with high quality jobs unavailable to unskilled workers. Moen (2002) considers the relative welfare of good and bad workers in a labour market where they search in different markets. Shi (2002) considers a directed search model in which high tech firms receive both skilled and unskilled workers, but low tech firms only receive low skill workers. Shi concludes that the low skill workers will receive different wages in the different jobs. These examples show that many labour markets share a common internal structure, so that general results for OLM's have widespread applicability.
A market where all workers are the same and all jobs are the same is termed here an ordinary market with homogeneous agents. Labour markets with heterogeneous agents can often be analyzed as collections of ordinary markets with homogeneous agents. In frictionless assignment models, workers self-select jobs so each worker is in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents (Tinbergen, 1951 (Tinbergen, , 1956 Sattinger, 1975; Teulings, 1995) . For example, in Tinbergen's analysis (1956), labour market compartments form that consist of a single type of worker and a single type of job. More recently, labour markets have been considered in which a given type of worker only searches for a given type of job (Moen, 1997; Shi, 2001; Mortensen and Wright, 2002) . Each worker is again in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents, but the labour market (or compartment, to use Tinbergen's term) is now characterized as having search or matching frictions.
Ordinary markets with heterogeneous agents have also been considered in which each type of worker seeks all types of jobs and each type of employer seeks (or interviews) all types of workers. Then all workers are pooled to form the labour supply, and all jobs are pooled to form the labour demand (Sattinger, 1995; Morgan, 1995; Lu and McAfee, 1996; Shimer and Smith, 2000) .
The next section establishes the equilibrium in an OLM. Section 3 relates efficiency in an OLM to efficiency in ordinary markets with homogeneous agents. If the OLM is irreducible, so that separate markets for s 1 and s 2 workers at k 2 jobs do not arise, then efficiency results when a particular condition holds. Section 4 analyzes distribution. A proportional increase in all jobs can reduce the wage differential between more skilled and less skilled workers. Production changes corresponding to skill biased technological change are also considered. Section 9 summarizes differences between results for OLM's and previous analysis and indicates future extensions.
Equilibrium Assignment

Solution for Ordinary Market
As a preliminary to derivation of the equilibrium assignment in an OLM, this section derives the solution for an ordinary market with homogeneous agents using the same underlying assumptions and notation as for the OLM. Suppose there are N s workers and N k jobs. Production occurs when a worker is matched with a job, yielding production of a. Let u be the unemployment rate for workers and let v be the vacancy rate for jobs. Workers find jobs through a matching technology described by a matching function. Let M (vN k , uN s ) be the rate at which matches occur per period if there are uN s unemployed workers and vN k vacant jobs (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; and Rogerson and Wright, 2002 , for discussions of the matching function). Assume M has constant returns to scale, is an increasing function of its arguments, has decreasing marginal returns, and is zero if either uN s or vN k is zero. Assume matches between workers and jobs break up at the exogenous rate γ.
The steady state values of u and v are determined from
The first condition arises because the number of matched (or non-vacant) jobs must equal the number of matched (or employed) workers in a steady state. The second condition arises because the flow of jobs becoming vacant must equal the rate of formation of new matches. The steady state conditions in 1 can be reexpressed in terms of the ratio of vacancies to unemployed, often referred to as market tightness. Let θ = vN k /(uN s ). Since it has constant returns to scale,
is the rate at which unemployed workers get matches, and m(θ)/θ is the rate at which vacancies get matches. Assume m(θ) is invertible, i.e. that m(θ) = x can be solved for θ as a function of x. Using θ and m(θ), 1 becomes
Solving 2 yields the steady state unemployment and vacancy rates given θ:
From differentiation and assumptions about the matching function, it can be shown that ∂u/∂θ < 0 and ∂v/∂θ > 0. The measure of market tightness, θ, depends on the ratio of jobs to workers in the market. Define η = N k /N s as the market ratio. Then
where u and v are functions of θ determined by 3. Implicit differentiation yields
Comparisons between markets are summarized as follows, using subscripts to denote different markets.
Theorem 1 Let η 1 and η 2 be the market ratios for two ordinary markets with homogeneous agents. If
Proof. Since θ is a monotonic function of η, two markets will have the same market tightness whenever the market ratios in the two markets are the same. If η 1 > (<)η 2 , comparisons between θ 1 and θ 2 arise from 5, and then comparisons between unemployment and vacancy rates arise from 3, completing the proof.
Wages and profits are determined through generalized Nash bargaining over the surplus from a match as follows (Pissarides, 2000, pp. 15-17) . 2 Let w be the wage rate and let W u and W e be a worker's expected present discounted values of income from being unemployed and employed, respectively. Then W u and W e satisfy
1 The derivatives of M with respect to its arguments are positive by assumption so that m 0 (θ) = M 1 (θ, 1) > 0 when θ > 0. By Euler's theorem, since M is homogeneous of degree one,
The denominator in dθ/dη is therefore positive, so that dθ/dη > 0. where r is the discount rate for workers. In 6, the flow of value for unemployed workers, given by rW U , equals the transition rate into employment times the gain in value. The flow of value for employed workers, rW E , equals the wage rate plus the transition rate into unemployment times the loss in value from the transition. Similarly, let W F and W V be the employers' present discounted values for a job that is filled and vacant, respectively. Then W F and W V satisfy
In generalized Nash bargaining, the flow value rW U serves as the reservation wage for workers and the flow value rW V serves as the reservation profit for firms. Let β be the relative measure of labour's bargaining strength. Then the wage determined by bargaining satisfies
Substituting the solutions for W U from 6 and W V from 7 into 8 and solving yields
As a simplification, consider the wage in the limit as the discount rate approaches zero. Then
Then from 10 and 5,
Then Y s is the expected income of a worker, calculated as the proportion of time employed times the wage rate. It can be shown that Y s is the limit of rW U as r approaches zero. Similarly, Y k is the expected income (or profit) for a job.
In terms of expected incomes, the equilibrium wage rate determined through bargaining satisfies
As θ increases, u decreases and v increases (from 3) and w increases (from 10). Then applying 5,
The matching function m(θ) drops out of the ratio of expected incomes, which simplifies to
Solution for OLM
Now suppose there are two types of workers, s 1 and s 2 , and two types of jobs, k 1 and k 2 . Suppose there are N s1 and N s2 workers of types s 1 and s 2 , respectively, and N k1 and N k2 jobs of types k 1 and k 2 , respectively. Let a ij be the production rate when an s i worker is matched with a k j job. Matches between s 2 workers and k 1 jobs do not form, generating an OLM. Assume a 11 > a 12 > a 22 , so that type s 1 workers are more productive than type s 2 , and type k 1 jobs are more productive than type k 2 . Then the more productive workers have access to both types of jobs, while the less productive workers can only get the less productive jobs. 3 Assume that the same matching function as in Section 2.1 operates in any submarket where workers of a single type are matched with jobs of a single type.
For the basic OLM model, suppose s 1 workers choose either to seek k 1 jobs or k 2 jobs, but not both. Similarly, suppose employers with k 2 jobs can choose either to seek s 1 workers or s 2 workers, but not both. (Section 3.3 will consider alternatives to these assumptions and their consequences.) Given these assumptions, the OLM reduces to three ordinary submarkets with homogeneous agents. Subscripts ij will be used to represent the value of a parameter or variable in the submarket where type s i workers are matched with type k j jobs. Let δ be the proportion of type s 1 workers seeking k 2 jobs, and let µ be the proportion of k 2 jobs for which employers seek s 1 workers. Then the market ratios in the three submarkets are
Given these market ratios, the market tightness ratios θ ij in each submarket can be determined by solving 4, the unemployment and vacancy rates can be determined from 3, and the wage rates and expected incomes from 10 and 13. Equilibrium in the OLM requires that s 1 workers be indifferent between seeking k 1 jobs or k 2 jobs. This occurs when the expected incomes are equal. Equilibrium also requires that employers with k 2 jobs be indifferent between seeking s 1 and s 2 workers, so that the expected incomes must be equal. Equilibrium in the OLM therefore occurs when δ and µ are such that
Equilibrium can be calculated and existence and uniqueness demonstrated using the following procedure. Consider a tentative level of market tightness in the second submarket, b θ 12 . First, all of the other variables in the OLM, including δ and µ, can be derived from b θ 12 . From 3 and 13, b θ 12 determines u 12 and w 12 and therefore Y s12 = (1 − u 12 )w 12 . By the equilibrium condition 17, Y s11 = Y s12 . Then θ 11 can be determined from Y s11 and η 11 from 4. Since 22 , which determines η 22 , and µ can be determined as 1 − N s2 η 22 /N k2 .
Second, with all the other variables in the OLM derived from b θ 12 , it is also possible to derive a value of θ 12 . Let H( b θ 12 ) be the derived value of θ 12 . It is found by solving 4 for θ, with η = µN k2 /(δN s1 ), using the derived values of δ and µ. Equilibrium occurs when H( b θ 12 ) = b θ 12 .
Theorem 2 If there is a level of b θ 12 at which the derived values of δ and µ are both positive, then an equilibrium for the OLM exists and is unique. Figure 1 shows the determination of the equilibrium value of θ 12 at point A, from which all the other variables can be derived. 5 The downward sloping curve is H( b θ 12 ), and the upward sloping line is b θ 12 (i.e., the line with slope one).
Efficiency
Marginal Products
Production in the OLM can be calculated as
where unemployment and vacancy rates are functions of the numbers of different types of workers and jobs and the proportions δ and µ. 4 The requirement that δ and µ be positive for some value of b θ 12 rules out the case where no s 1 workers seek k 2 jobs and no employers with k 2 jobs seek s 1 workers.
5 Figure 1 assumes N s1 = N k2 = 2, N k1 = N s2 = 1, a 11 = 2, a 12 = 1.5, a 22 = 1, β 11 = β 12 = β 22 = .5, γ = .05, and m(θ) = θ 1/2 . The equilibrium occurs at δ = .496, µ = .508, and θ 12 = 1.594. In Figure 1 , the minimum value of b θ 12 is at .0033, where δ = 0, and the maximum value is at 607, where µ = 0. Using 18, it is possible to obtain the marginal products of k 1 jobs or s 2 workers through differentiation:
For s 1 workers, separate marginal products can be calculated depending on whether the workers match with k 1 or k 2 jobs. These marginal products are combinations of the derivatives of y with respect to N s1 and δ. Changes in N s1 and δ affect both the number of workers with k 1 jobs and the number with k 2 jobs. A combination that increases the number with k 1 jobs by one and leaves the number with k 2 jobs the same solves
The solution is 4N s1 = 1, 4δ = −δ/N s1 . Then
Similarly,
These marginal products are used in the next section to establish conditions for efficiency in an OLM.
Conditions for Efficiency
Definition 3 An OLM is efficient if the allocation of workers and jobs among submarkets maximizes production.
A necessary condition for efficiency is that an s 1 worker must have the same marginal product whether seeking a k 1 job or a k 2 job, i.e. MP s11 = MP s12 . Otherwise movement of an s 1 worker from one submarket to another would raise production. Similarly, MP k12 = MP k22 is also a necessary condition for efficiency. Now consider whether decisions of workers and employers would satisfy the necessary conditions for efficiency in an OLM. Workers of type s 1 seek k 1 or k 2 jobs depending on which offers a higher expected income, Y s11 or Y s12 . Their behavior brings the two expected incomes into equality, a condition for equilibrium in 17. Similarly, behavior of employers with type k 2 jobs brings expected incomes Y k12 and Y k22 into equality. From Section 2.1, the expected incomes equal the reservation wages and profits that workers and employers would choose when searching for matches. If the reservation wages and profits equal the corresponding marginal products, then worker and employer behavior would lead to the satisfaction of the necessary conditions for efficiency.
The conditions for reservation wages and profits to equal the corresponding marginal products have been established in the literature on search congestion for ordinary markets with homogeneous agents. Search congestion arises when an agent's reservation wage or profit differs from the agent's marginal product, leading to overentry or underentry in the market. Diamond (1982) established conditions for the absence of search congestion under the assumption that the surplus from a match is shared equally (see also Mortensen, 1982 , and Lockwood, 1986 , 1999 . Hosios (1990, p. 286 ) demonstrated that search congestion is absent if the share of the match surplus going to a worker equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed workers. In Section 2.1, the match surplus share is given by β,and in the OLM the share in the submarket with worker type s i and job type k j is β ij .
Market mechanisms exist that would bring about the match surplus shares satisfying the Hosios condition. Sattinger (1990, pp. 366-369) describes a nonbargaining mechanism where employers can attract more applicants to a vacancy by offering a higher wage prior to a match. The employer first-order condition in equilibrium requires that expected incomes be proportional to marginal contributions to interviews, which is equivalent to the Hosios condition. Moen (1997) describes a more rigorous model in which firms advertise the wages they pay. Other market mechanisms, such as brokers, may also bring about efficiency. Efficiency conditions for markets with heterogeneous agents have been derived by Moen (1997) , Shi (2001) and Mortensen and Wright (2002) . In these models, agents of a given type on one side of the market only trade with agents of a single type on the other side. All trade therefore takes place in ordinary markets with homogeneous agents.
Efficiency in an OLM can be directly related to these results. If the match surplus share in each submarket satisfies the Hosios condition, then reservation wages and profits in each submarket equal the corresponding marginal products, yielding efficiency. Specifically, when the β ij satisfy the Hosios condition for the submarket with s i workers and k j jobs, Y sij = MP sij and Y kij = MP kij . Then dy/dδ = dy/dµ = 0, so that the OLM will be efficient.
Irreducible Overlapping Labour Markets
The previous section indicates that if wage determination takes place through bargaining and if the match surplus shares do not satisfy the Hosios condition, then inefficiency results. The consequences for the submarkets in an OLM are the same as for ordinary markets with homogeneous workers and are already described in the literature.
This section considers a second potential source of inefficiency that is particular to an OLM. In the derivation of equilibrium in Section 2.2, unemployed s 1 workers can distinguish k 1 jobs from k 2 jobs before they seek employment, and choose between the two submarkets. This is a form of directed search, applying to submarkets rather than individual employers. The same assumption is applied to employers with k 2 jobs, allowing them to choose whether to interview s 1 or s 2 workers. This generates two submarkets, one where employers with k 2 jobs interview and hire s 1 workers, and one where they interview and hire s 2 workers.
Now consider an alternative OLM in which employers with k 2 jobs cannot distinguish between s 1 and s 2 workers prior to job interviews. For example, employers with clerk jobs may not require a college degree, so that applicants with and without a college degree would apply. This would occur if employers passively await job applicants, employers lack information about applicants prior to interviews, or there are legal restrictions preventing unequal treatment at the interview stage. As a result, separate submarkets for s 1 and s 2 workers at k 2 jobs do not form, and employers with k 2 jobs face a labor market with pooled s 1 and s 2 workers. If no pooling occured in actual labour markets, employers would know everything relevant about prospective workers before interviews, and interviews would serve no role in selecting workers. Some degree of pooling is therefore likely in actual labour markets. The following definition formalizes the distinction between the two forms of an OLM.
Definition 4
In a reducible Overlapping Labour Market, agents distinguish among types of agents with whom they match, so that the Overlapping Labour Market resolves into submarkets with one type of worker and one type of job.
The OLM considered in this section is irreducible since separate submarkets for s 1 and s 2 workers seeking k 2 jobs will not form. Equilibrium in this irreducible OLM is determined as follows. As before, s 1 workers choose between seeking k 1 and k 2 jobs. The proportion seeking k 2 jobs, δ, then satisfies Y s11 = Y s12 in equilibrium. Employers with k 2 jobs will hire both s 1 and s 2 workers as they arrive for interviews, rather than some employers hiring s 1 workers and some employers hiring s 2 workers. Employers will then face a common vacancy rate in the market, v 2 . Since the s 1 and s 2 workers seeking k 2 jobs are pooled in a single labor market, they will also experience a common unemployment rate, u 2 . The number of s 1 and s 2 workers seeking k 2 jobs is δN s1 + N s2 . Assume the matching function in this submarket, with pooled s 1 and s 2 workers, is the same as in the other submarkets. Substituting the market ratio η 12 = N k2 /(δN s1 + N s2 ) into 4 determines θ 12 , and then u 2 and v 2 are found from 3. Although µ is no longer determined by employers with k 2 jobs, the proportion of k 2 jobs going to s 1 workers can be calculated as
The wages for s 1 and s 2 workers at k 2 jobs are calculated somewhat differently from Section 2.1. Because of differences in outputs a 12 and a 22 , employers with k 2 jobs will pay different wages to s 1 and s 2 workers after bargaining. As before, let w 12 and w 22 be the wages for s 1 and s 2 workers, respectively. Then Y s12 = (1 − u 2 )w 12 and Y s22 = (1 − u 2 )w 22 . The expected profit rate for an employer with a filled k 2 job is φ(a 12 − w 12 ) + (1 − φ)(a 22 − w 22 ). Under the simplifying assumption that the interest rate is zero, the reservation profit level used by the employer in bargaining is
As before, let β 12 and β 22 be the match surplus shares going to s 1 and s 2 workers at k 2 jobs, respectively. Then in equilibrium the wages must satisfy
Equilibrium in an irreducible OLM can be determined as follows. Consider an arbitrary value of δ, so that η 11 = N k1 /((1 − δ)N s1 ). Then conditions in Section 2.1 for the ordinary market with homogeneous agents determine u 11 , v 11 , w 11 , and Y s11 . In the pooled second submarket, δ determines θ 12 as before, φ from 26, u 2 and v 2 from 3, and w 12 and w 22 from 28 and 29 (with Y k2 given by 27). Then Y s12 can be calculated as (1−u 2 )w 12 . As δ goes from 0 to 1, s 1 workers move from the first submarket to the second pooled submarket, increasing Y s11 and decreasing Y s12 . Equilibrium in the irreducible OLM occurs at the value of δ such that Y s11 = Y s12 .
Inefficiency in an Irreducible Overlapping Labour Market
Inefficiency in an irreducible OLM will be analyzed by comparison with an efficient reducible OLM. The following theorem provides a benchmark case in which the equilibrium solutions to a reducible OLM and an irreducible OLM with the same parameters will be identical.
Theorem 5 Assume that a reducible OLM has an equilibrium with
Then i. the reducible OLM has η 12 = η 22, u 12 = u 22 , and v 12 = v 22 ; ii. the equilibrium solution for the reducible OLM will also be the equilibrium solution for the irreducible OLM.
Proof. Given 30, the market ratios in the reducible OLM are
Since η 12 = η 22, the unemployment and vacancy rate solutions will be the same, establishing i. Let δ R be the equilibrium value of δ in the reducible OLM and let η 2 be the market ratio for the pooled submarket with both s 1 and s 2 workers. Then at δ = δ R ,
Since the market ratios are the same, the pooled submarket has the same unemployment and vacancy rates as the submarkets in the reducible OLM. Because the reducible OLM was in equilibrium, Y k12 = Y k22 or
Since v 12 = v 22 from part i, a 12 − w 12 = a 22 − w 22 . Then the expected income for an employer with a k 2 job in the irreducible OLM is
Then the wages w 12 and w 22 from the reducible OLM will also satisfy the bargaining conditions in the irreducible OLM. At δ = δ R , Y s12 will then be the same in the irreducible OLM as in the reducible OLM, and Y s11 will continue to be the same. Then δ R will also be the equilibrium value of δ in the irreducible OLM and the unemployment, vacancy and wage rates will also be the same, completing the proof. Essentially, the irreducible OLM has the same solution as the reducible OLM when 30 holds because employers with k 2 jobs, if they could choose which workers to seek, would seek the same proportion of s 1 workers as generated by the pooled submarket in 26. The next theorem is a companion to theorem 5, identifying a condition in the irreducible OLM (instead of in the reducible OLM) that indicates when the two solutions will be the same.
Theorem 6
Assume that an irreducible OLM has an equilibrium with δ = δ I and a 12 − w 12 = a 22 − w 22 (36)
Then i. the reducible OLM with the same parameters has µ = δ I N s1 /(δ I N s1 + N s2 ) and ii. the equilibrium solution for the reducible and irreducible OLM's are the same.
Proof. Since the irreducible OLM is in equilibrium,
, a reducible OLM with the same parameters will have
Thus η 12 = η 22 in the reducible OLM and both market ratios equal η 2 in the irreducible OLM. Then u 12 = u 22 = u 2 by Theorem 1. Using the values of variables in the irreducible OLM, the expected incomes for employers with k 2 jobs are
, the equilibrium conditions for the reducible OLM in 17 are satisfied by the equilibrium solution for the irreducible OLM, completing the proof.
With theorems 5 and 6 in place, conditions for an irreducible OLM to be efficient can now be identified.
Theorem 7 An irreducible OLM is efficient if 36 holds and the reducible OLM with the same parameters is efficient.
Proof. Given 36, the solution to the irreducible OLM will be the same as the solution to the reducible OLM with the same parameters, by theorem 6. If the reducible OLM is efficient, MP s11 = MP s12 and MP k12 = MP k22 . Since the allocation is the same, these conditions also hold for the irreducible OLM with the same solution, establishing efficiency and completing the proof.
The misallocation arising when 30 does not hold can be briefly described. Suppose a reducible OLM is efficient and µ > δN s1 / (δN s1 + N s2 ) . Then in the irreducible OLM with the same parameters, fewer k 2 jobs will be allocated to s 1 workers than for efficiency. The misallocation arises because, in the irreducible OLM, employers with k 2 jobs cannot shift interviews to s 1 workers, for whom the returns are higher. The misallocation of k 2 jobs in this case generates a misallocation of s 1 workers. The unemployment rate for s 1 workers in the irreducible OLM will be given by the higher pooled rate, u 2 , reducing Y s12 . Then for equilibrium in the irreducible OLM, there will be fewer s 1 workers seeking k 2 jobs than for efficiency. In response to these misallocations, it is possible to identify policies that would move the labor market towards an efficient allocation. One policy would be to tax employment of s 1 workers at k 1 jobs. This would reduce Y s11 (at a given value of δ) and induce more s 1 workers to seek k 2 jobs, raising δ. While δ may approach its efficient level, there could still be misallocations of k 2 jobs between s 1 and s 2 workers, caused by pooling in the irreducible OLM. Although the policy of taxing s 1 workers at k 1 jobs could increase production, it would have distributional effects on incomes of workers and employers.
Distribution
Supply and Demand Shifts
An OLM differs from an ordinary market with homogeneous agents in that proportional changes in all types of jobs can affect the distribution of earnings among workers. In an ordinary market with homogeneous agents, changes in supply or demand affect the distribution of income between workers and employers. However, questions about the distribution of earnings among workers are absent for the simple reason that all workers are affected uniformly (at least ex ante). This section analyzes the impact of proportional changes in all workers or jobs.
Specifically, assume
where N kj0 is fixed, j = 1, 2. An increase in ρ therefore represents a proportional expansion in the numbers of both types of jobs. The effect of ρ on the wage rates can be decomposed as
From 10,
This result immediately yields the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Theorem 9
Comparing two ordinary markets with homogeneous labour that experience the same increase in the tightness ratio θ, the labour market with the lower tightness ratio (and higher unemployment rate) will experience the greater proportional wage increase.
From 5, dθ ij /dη ij > 0. The market ratios are proportional to ρ so that ∂η ij /∂ρ > 0, i, j = 1, 2. The other partial derivatives in the brackets in 39 depend on the specific submarket. From 16,
Now consider how δ and µ change when ρ goes up. In hierarchical assignment models, more productive workers are generally assigned to more productive jobs. With a top-down assignment, an increase in numbers of all jobs results in workers being reassigned to more productive jobs. The same phenomenon is at work in an OLM. Type s 1 workers at k 2 jobs serve as a potential source of workers for k 1 jobs. When numbers of jobs increase, s 1 workers shift from k 2 jobs to k 1 jobs (if the difference in output a 11 − a 12 is sufficiently large). Then δ is smaller for larger ρ. The decline in s 1 workers at k 2 jobs leads employers with k 2 jobs to switch to s 2 workers, reducing µ. Now compare the proportional changes in w 11 and w 22 in moving to a higher ρ. If θ 11 > θ 22 , theorem 8 implies that
Since ∂η 11 /∂δ > 0, the decline in δ contributes to a lower proportional change in w 11 . Since ∂η 22 /∂µ < 0, the decline in µ contributes to a greater proportional change in w 22 . On the basis of these comparisons, if θ 11 > θ 22 , a proportional increase in jobs would reduce w 11 /w 22 . A proportional increase in numbers of workers, N s1 and N s2 , would have the same effects as a reduction in ρ. Table 1 shows the distributional effects of ρ = 1.02 versus ρ = .98 using the same assumptions as for Figure 1 . At the higher level of ρ, w 11 /w 22 is lower, consistent with the foregoing analysis and the declines in δ and µ. Using expected earnings to compare s 1 and s 2 workers, Y s11 /Y s22 is also lower at a higher ρ. Thus proportional changes in numbers of jobs or numbers of workers have distributional impacts in an OLM. Table 1 can also be used to describe the adjustment of an OLM to different states in a business cycle. 7 Because of the adjustments in δ and µ, the submarket with more productive s 1 workers and k 1 jobs experiences smaller fluctuations in wages and unemployment rates than the submarket with s 2 workers and k 2 jobs.
It is possible to undertake comparative static analysis of changes in individual parameters in the OLM. For example, an increase in N s2 , corresponding to an influx of less-skilled workers, results in Y k22 > Y k12 at the former levels of δ and µ. Then using the analysis in Figure 1 , it can be shown that δ and µ decline, Y k22 and Y k12 increase, Y s11 and Y s12 decline, and both w 11 and w 22 decline. The influx of less skilled workers results in wage declines for all workers in the OLM.
Productivity Increases
Changes in the output levels a ij can also have distributional effects. If the output levels a ij all increase by the same proportion, then an increase in all wages by the same proportion will return the OLM to equilibrium with no changes in δ, µ, market ratios or relative incomes. If the output levels change by unequal proportions, then there will in general be distributional impacts. An increase in a 11 , holding a 12 and a 22 constant, can be interpreted as skill biased technological change, which has been proposed as an explanation for observed increases in skill differentials. 8 In a number of theoretical contexts, skill biased technological change can be shown to yield an increase in skill differentials. Using the OLM, the effects of an increase in a 11 can be determined and yield an increase in w 11 /w 22 . However, this result does not by itself establish that skill biased technological change is present or that it is the cause of observed increases in skill differentials, since other changes could also raise skill differentials. For example, Section 4.1 7 Equilibrium in an OLM is derived in Section 2.2 assuming workers and empoyers believe conditions will continue indefinitely. Application of the solutions to different stages in a business cycle requires the assumption that expectations correspond to current conditions. 8 It is also possible to interpret skill biased technological change as an increase in both a 11 and a 12 , which would require a different analysis.
shows that a proportional increase in labour supply can raise the skill differential w 11 /w 22 while raising the ratio of s 1 workers at k 1 jobs to s 2 workers at k 2 jobs, (1 − u 11 )N s1 / ((1 − u 22 )N s2 ) .The following theorem provides ancillary consequences that could be used to determine whether an increase in skill differentials is caused by skill biased technological change.
Theorem 10 Consider a reducible OLM in equilibrium with δ = δ 0 , µ = µ 0 and θ 12 = θ 0 . Suppose a 11 increases, with all other parameters staying the same. Then in the new equilibrium, i. θ 12 > θ 0 , ii. u 12 is lower, v 12 is higher, w 12 is higher, Y s12 is higher and Y k12 is lower; iii. Y s11 is higher and Y k22 is lower; iv. µ is lower, θ 22 is higher and u 22 is lower; v. δ and θ 11 are lower and u 11 is higher.
Proof. The result concerning θ 12 will be established using the argument for existence and uniqueness in Section 2.2. At b θ 12 = θ 0 , the derived value of Y s12 stays the same. Since Y s11 at δ 0 increases (from the higher value of a 11 ), the derived value of δ (at which Y s11 = Y s12 ) must be lower. The derived value of η 12 at θ 0 , given by µN k2 /(δN s1 ), increases. By 5, the derived value H(θ 0 ) also increases. Thus the function H( b θ 12 ) in Figure 1 shifts upward, so that the equilibrium value of θ 12 must be greater, establishing i. The results in ii. follow from i. using the results in Section 2.1. Since Y s11 = Y s12 , Y s11 is greater in the new equilibrium; since Y k22 = Y k12 , Y k22 is lower in the new equilibrium, establishing iii. The lower value of Y k22 implies η 22 and θ 22 are higher, from 14. Then µ and u 22 must be lower, establishing iv. Since θ 12 is higher from i., η 12 is also higher. Since µ is lower while η 12 = µN k2 /(δN s1 ) is higher, δ must be lower. Then η 11 and θ 11 are lower and u 11 is higher, establishing v. and completing the proof.
The most notable result in theorem 9 is that the unemployment rate for s 1 workers at k 1 jobs increases, since s 1 workers shift from seeking k 2 to seeking k 1 jobs. At the same time, the unemployment rate for s 1 workers at k 2 jobs goes down.
Conclusions
This paper has emphasized differences between OLM's and ordinary markets with homogeneous or heterogeneous workers. Conditions for efficiency in ordinary markets with homogeneous workers are extended to irreducible OLM's in theorems 5 through 7. When employers with k 2 jobs do not distinguish between s 1 and s 2 workers at the interview or meeting stage, a misallocation of interviews arises unless 30 holds.
In an ordinary market with homogeneous workers, supply and demand shifts can have no effects on relative wages of workers since all workers are affected uniformly. However, in an OLM, a proportional increase in all jobs can have distributional impacts. In the example shown in Table 1 , a proportional increase in jobs reduces the wage differential w 11 /w 22 . Relative wage changes previously attributed to skill biased technological change could then be generated by simple changes in supply and demand. Theorem 9 provides results that can be used to distinguish between skill biased technological change and other causes.
An essential feature of OLM's is that s 1 workers at k 2 jobs serve as a reserve of labour for the more productive k 1 jobs. Then an increase in output at k 1 jobs, or simply a proportional increase in all jobs, can lead s 1 workers to shift to seeking k 1 jobs. Depending on the availability of s 1 workers, employers with k 2 jobs may shift the jobs away from the low-paid s 2 workers.
While a market is a fundamental concept in economics, the boundaries of a market are poorly defined in both product and factor markets. With extensive heterogeneity among workers and among jobs, it is unlikely that knowledge of worker and job types would be sufficient to partition labour markets so finely that each worker was in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents. Alternatively, it can be characterized as an ordinary labour market with heterogeneous agents only if workers and employers have so little knowledge of each other that they waste substantial time in meetings and interviews that could not lead to matches. Neither ordinary markets with homogeneous agents nor ordinary markets with heterogeneous agents can realistically characterize aggregate labour markets. Overlapping Labour Markets arise with partial but incomplete knowledge of the types with which an agent matches and therefore provides a more faithful representation of actual labour markets.
